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Abstract
In this paper we provide a framework to reason about limited awareness of the action space in
ﬁnitely repeated games. Our framework is rich enough to capture the full strategic aspect of
limited awareness in a dynamic setting, taking into account the possibility that agents might
want to reveal or conceal actions to their opponent or that they might become “aware of un-
awareness" upon observing non rationalizable behavior. We show that one can think of these
situations as a game with incomplete information, which is fundamentally different, though,
from the standard treatment of repeated games with incomplete information. We establish
conditions on the “level of mutual awareness" of the action space needed to recover Nash
and subgame perfect Nash equilibria from the standard theory with common knowledge. We
also show that the set of sustainable payoffs in games with folk theorems does not relate in a
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1. Introduction
While standard game theory implicitly assumes that players can reason about all aspects of a
game, this assumption is certainly too strong in some real life strategic interactions. As an exam-
ple consider a ﬁrm procuring maintenance services from the company they bought some compli-
cated machines from. The company tells them that there are essentially two maintenance options
A and B and they agree on a contract specifying the price for each of the two options. After start-
ing the maintenance work, though, the company makes an unexpected announcement to the ﬁrm
telling them that the situation is more complex and that now the best option would be option
C, a contingency the ﬁrm was initially unaware of.1 Note, though, that the second time the ﬁrm
procures maintenance services it will not be unaware of possibility C. Other examples include ﬁ-
nancial markets where some investors might not be aware of some (complex) investment options,
tax avoidance possibilities etc...
Much of the strategic interest in these examples resides in the fact that awareness might change
over time. Just as the ﬁrm becomes aware of option C after observing it once, investors in ﬁnancial
markets will learn about an action they were previously unaware of once one of their competitors
has successfully applied it. Of course this raises the question whether and when an investor
wants to reveal such options to other investors. The dynamic model also raises another issue.
Think of an investor i that observes a competitor j choosing an action which he is aware of, but
which seems completely irrational to him. Such an investor might become "suspicious" or "aware
of unawareness". In this case investor i might want to make an effort to "discover" new options,
since he suspects to be unaware of something. But then again if investor j knows that i might
become suspicious shouldn’t it be optimal for him to refrain from choosing such an option ?
These examples suggest that by neglecting the dynamic aspect of limited awareness onemisses
out on a number of interesting strategic phenomena. A complete theory of belief and strategic
choices should thus allow for the discovery of new, previously unconsidered propositions, actions
or states of nature and provide a framework to analyze the whole range of strategic implications
that follow. Existing literature, though, has largely neglected the interesting strategic issues that
arise from the essentially dynamic structure of unawareness. Few exceptions are Heifetz, Meier
and Schipper (2009) as well as Halpern and Rego (2006) or Grant and Quiggin (2007), all of which
we will discuss below.
In this paper we take an explicitly dynamic approach that is able to capture all the phenomena
discussed above. We model agents interacting in ﬁnitely repeated two-player games allowing for
1Lee (2008) among others discusses contracting with unforeseen contingencies.
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the possibility that one (or both) agents might not be aware of the entire action set.2 Naturally in
such a dynamic setting the possibility arises that agents might become aware of (or "discover")
actions they were previously unaware of. An obvious instance where this occurs is if they ob-
serve the opponent choose an action they were previously unaware of. Such considerations entail
the question of whether agents can be "aware of unawareness" and how and whether this can
be reconciled with the rationality of agents. Unlike Grant and Quiggin (2007) we try to model
"discovery" of new actions by staying as close as possible to the principle of rationality. We as-
sume that agents are "conﬁdent", meaning that - as long as all observed behavior is rationalizable
given their current awareness - they are not aware of the fact that they might be unaware of
something. If they do observe something, though, that is not rationalizable for them we say they
become "aware of unawareness" and only in this case they might discover actions they were not
previously aware of.
Of course agents can also reason about their opponent’s awareness and hence form beliefs
about it. In fact the entire hierarchy of beliefs has to be considered. We use a set theoretic struc-
ture to model unawareness and show that one can think of this problem as a (repeated) game of
incomplete information where each agent’s type describes his current awareness together with a
hierarchy of beliefs about his opponent’s awareness. Such a type space, though, cannot capture
the essentially dynamic nature of the problem. We thus introduce a type space for the dynamic
setting where each type includes a player i’s awareness, beliefs about the other player j’s aware-
ness, beliefs about the beliefs of j about the awareness of i etc.. at all contingencies of the game.
This setting is no longer equivalent to a standard incomplete information setting (for repeated
games), since players might not initially be aware of all their information sets. Such unforeseen
contingencies might lead to changes in the agent’s awareness and induce e.g. the possibility that
an agent’s current belief about the opponent’s future type is correlated with his action choice.3
We show that this difference is far from innocuous and has implications for equilibrium play that
we will discuss below. We impose some restrictions on types, such as coherency (a player cannot
believe that his opponent is aware of more things than himself), perfect recall and few others and
show that the resulting type space is well behaved. We deﬁne what rationalizable behavior is in
this context, deﬁne Nash (and subgame perfect Nash) equilibrium and prove their existence.
2The question might come to mind why we consider limited awareness of the action space and not of some
repeated game strategies. Given full awareness of the action space the latter would essentially mean a departure
from rationality. Since we want to distinguish between awareness and rationality we assume that our players are
fully rational (in the standard game theoretic sense) given their awareness.
3Other differences to the incomplete information setting (Aumann and Maschler, 1995) are that we do not require
Bayesian updating or common prior in our general set up.
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In the second part of the paper we study the implications of limited awareness for equilib-
rium play in such games and show that even a "small amount" of unawareness is enough to
yield different paths of play in equilibrium. In particular we establish conditions that ensure that
awareness converges and study the restrictions on the type space needed to guarantee that the
paths induced in Nash equilibria and subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the game with common
knowledge of the action space can still be induced in a subjective equilibrium of the game with
limited awareness. We ﬁnd that ﬁrst-order mutual knowledge of the action set is a necessary and
sufﬁcient condition to guarantee that every Nash equilibrium from the common knowledge case
can be recovered under limited awareness in any game. For subgame perfection second order
mutual knowledge is both necessary and sufﬁcient. We also study the set of equilibrium payoffs
in games where the Nash folk theorem for ﬁnitely repeated games applies (Benoit and Krishna,
1987) and show that it relates in a non-monotonic way to the awareness of agents. This arises
because our framework (due to the fact that there may be unforeseen contingencies) produces a
distinction between subjectively and objectively individually rational behavior in a natural way.
This cannot occur in the standard theory of repeated games with incomplete information.4
The work that is most closely related to ours is probably the work by Halpern and Rego (2006),
Sadzik (2006) or Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2007, 2008, 2009) on the other hand. Heifetz, Meier
and Schipper (2007) as well as Sadzik (2006) deﬁne Bayesian equilibrium for static games with
unawareness. Halpern and Rego (2006) provide a semantic model for games with unawareness,
deﬁne a Nash equilibrium for such games and show its existence. Heifetz, Meier and Schip-
per (2008) also provide a semantic (state space) construction for interactive unawareness. Their
framework (just as Halpern and Rego, 2006) allows agents to reason about the awareness of oth-
ers. They show that this construction retains a number of desired properties of unawareness when
unawareness is deﬁned as not knowing and not knowing that you don’t know. Using this model
they show that mutual unawareness can lead to speculative trade. In Heifetz, Meier and Schipper
(2009) they extend extensive form rationalizability to this setting. Since we aim to model limited
awareness as a game with incomplete information on our dynamic type space we use standard
rationalizability.
Also related are Grant and Quiggin (2007) already mentioned above who discuss the notion
of discovery. Feinberg (2004) provides a syntactic model to model limited awareness. He shows
that in ﬁnitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games introducing a small amount of unawareness
can have the same effect as the introduction of irrational types as in the seminal work by Kreps
and Wilson (1982).5 Another main difference between our approach and most of the existing
4See e.g. the textbook by Aumann and Maschler (1995).
5Other standard references include Fagin and Halpern (1988), Modica and Rustichini (1994, 1999) or Halpern
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literature is that we use a set theoretic structure (common in game theory), whereas the papers
mentioned above model unawareness relying on modal logic.6 Our paper also goes beyond much
of the received literature in trying to outline precise conditions under which limited awareness
will matter for equilibrium predictions in games. Note also that in our approach we require an
agent to be aware of actions before he can have beliefs about them avoiding the impossibility
result of Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (1998). In the language of Halpern (1988) our paper deals
with explicit rather than implicit knowledge.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the basic notation and give some
preliminaries. In Section 3 we introduce the basic model and in Section 4 we show how this
model of unawareness can generate interesting predictions for ﬁnitely repeated games. Proofs
are relegated to an Appendix.
2. Notation and preliminaries
We present some preliminaries on Polish spaces. For further reference see Kechris (1995). A
topological space Z,   is called Polish if it is separable and completely metrizable. A subspace
of a separable metrizable space is also separable and metrizable. Examples of Polish spaces in-
clude ﬁnite sets, Rn and closed subsets of Polish spaces endowed with the relative topology. The
countable product of Polish spaces, endowed with the product topology, is Polish. A countable
intersection of open subsets of Z is called Gδ. A subspace of a Polish space is Polish if and only if
it is Gδ.
For any topological space Z let ΔZ denote the set of all Borel probability measures, endowed
with the weak topology (). If Z is Polish then so is ΔZ (Aliprantis and Border, 1994). For some
μ  ΔZ let Γμ denote its support, i.e., the set of all points z  Z such that every T   with
z  T has positive measure: Γμ  z  Z : z  T    μT  0. The support is the
smallest closed subset of Z with measure equal to 1. If Z is separable and metrizable, the support
is unique (Parthasarathy, 1967).
2.1. Repeated games
Consider a ﬁnite normal form game G  	N, S, viiN
, where N  1, 2 is the set of players,
S : S1  S2 the action space, Si  s1i , ..., sJii  is player i’s (ﬁnite) set of actions, with si being
(2001).
6Also Li (2008), Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2007) and Copic and Galeotti (2007) use set theoretic structures
among few others. All these discuss static games, though.
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the typical element of Si, and vi : S  R player i’s payoff function. Consider i’s set of (mixed)
strategies ΔSi : σi  R Ji : ∑Jij1 σji  1, with typical element σi  σ1i , ..., σJii , and let σji
denote the probability that σi assigns to s
j
i . We deﬁne the expected payoff vi : ΔS  R as usual,
where ΔS : ΔS1 ΔS2. We call G the stage game or constituent game.
Suppose that G is played repeatedly for T periods. The realized play before time t is described
by the vector of action proﬁles played at τ  1, ..., t 1, and is called a t-history. A t-history can
be identiﬁed by the vector of action proﬁles that have been played during the ﬁrst t 1 periods,
i.e., ht can be rewritten as

s1, ..., st 1  St1, where sτ  s1τ, s2τ is the realized
action proﬁle at every τ  1, ..., t  1. Let Ht be the set of t-histories, with typical element ht.
Obviously there is a bijection between Ht and St1. Let H1  h1 be a singleton that contains
only the empty history h1 which corresponds to “no-action till now". A t  k-history htk is
called subsequent to ht whenever the ﬁrst t 1 elements of htk coincide with ht. In this case we
call ht a sub-history of htk. The set of ht’s subsequent histories is denoted by Hht, and the set
of ht’s subsequent t k-histories is denoted by Htkht. Finally, let H : Hh1  Tt1Ht.
At every time t, players observe some ht, the realized one. Player i’s stage strategy at time t
determines what i plays after having observed any possible t-history, i.e., σit : Ht  ΔSi. For
notation simplicity we omit the index t: We denote what the stage strategy that σit speciﬁes
to be played after some ht  Ht by σiht  ΔSi. We denote player i’s stage strategy space at
history ht by ΔSiht.
Let Δ

Si ht  hτHhtΔSihτ be i’s (behavioral) strategy space at the history ht, with
typical elementσi ht. Clearly,σi ht speciﬁes a contingent plan of strategies for player i at every
hτ which is subsequent to ht.
Player i’s expected payoff7 when σ ht : σ1ht,σ2ht is played is equal to
ui
σ ht  viσht 
T
∑
τt1
∑
hτHτht
βhτσhτ1viσhτ, (1)
where βhτσhτ1 denotes the probability to reach hτ given that σhτ1 is played at hτ1.
We say that σi ht is a best response to σ ht for player i at history ht, and we write σi ht 
BRi
σ ht, whenever
σi ht  arg max
Δ

Si ht
ui
σi ht,σj ht.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A strategy proﬁle σ ht is a Nash equilibrium at time ht whenever σi ht 
BRi
σ ht for all i  1, 2. We say that σ ht is a subgame perfect (Nash) equilibrium at ht
7Instead of the aggregate payoff, we could use the average payoff, but since the horizon is ﬁnite the two are
equivalent.
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wheneverσ htk is a Nash equilibrium for every htk subsequent to ht, whereσi htk speciﬁes
the same stage strategy as σi ht to every history after htk.
For some ht, consider the following sequence:
R0i ht  Δ

Si ht
R1i ht  σi ht  Δ

Si ht :
σi ht  BRiσj ht;σj ht  R0j ht
...
Rki ht  σi ht  Δ

Si ht :
σi ht  BRiσj ht;σj ht  Rk1j ht
...
Deﬁnition 2.2. A strategy proﬁle σ ht  σ1ht,σ2ht is rationalizable whenever
σi ht 

k0
Rki ht
for both i  1, 2.
2.2. Belief hierarchies and type spaces
We consider the standard framework introduced by Brandenburger and Dekel (1993): Let  de-
note the Polish underlying space of uncertainty. A belief hierarchy of player i describes what
i believes about X, what i believes that j believes about , and so on. Consider the following
sequence:
B0 : 
B1 : B0  ΔB0
...
Bk : Bk1  ΔBk1
...
A belief hierarchy is a vector θi : μ0, μ1, ...  ∞k1ΔBk, where μk denotes i’s k-th order beliefs.
Let Θ0 : ∞k1ΔBk denote the set of all belief hierarchies.
The following standard coherency restriction states that i’s higher order beliefs cannot contra-
dict her own lower order beliefs: A belief hierarchy satisﬁes coherency, i.e., margBk1 μk  μk1
for all k  0. Although, coherency rules out the possibility that i’s beliefs contradict each other,
it does not exclude hierarchies such that i believes that j’s beliefs are not coherent. In order to do
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so, we further restrict beliefs to hierarchies that satisfy common knowledge8 of coherency, and we
denote the space of those beliefs by Θ. Then, there is a homeomorphism g : Θ ΔΘ. This
result was independently proven by Mertens and Zamir (1985).
A type space is a tuple ΘiiN, giiN, where Θi is Polish and gi : Θi  Δ  Θj is
continuous. The type space yields a hierarchy of beliefs for every θi  Θi: Individual i’s ﬁrst
order beliefs are equal to the marginal distribution of giθi, i.e., marginalize from ΔΘj to
Δ. In order to obtain i’s second order beliefs go fromΘi to ΔΘj via gi, and then to Δ
ΔΘi via gj and marginalize to Δ Δ via image measures. Continue inductively to
obtain the entire hierarchy of beliefs. Harsanyi (1967-68) was the ﬁrst one to introduce the concept
of type spaces in order to model belief hierarchies.
Mertens and Zamir (1985), and Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) completed the analysis by
proving the previous result, which implies that there is a universal type space ΘiN, giN,
i.e., one that is both terminal and complete (Siniscalchi, 2007). That is, the universal type space
yields all possible hierarchies of beliefs, and at the same time the function g is onto, implying that
it does not impose any further uncertainty over the hierarchies of beliefs.
3. Awareness of the action space
3.1. Hierarchies of beliefs about awareness in the stage game
Let i be the discrete topology on Si, and let also  be the set of non-empty subsets 1 2 en-
dowed with the discrete topology. Elements A   correspond to different awareness structures
that a player may have about the stage game G.
When player i is aware of some A  , she also forms beliefs about what j is aware of, beliefs
about j’s beliefs about what i is aware of, and so on. Player i’s hierarchies of beliefs are modeled
in the standard way (see Section 2.2).
Unlike most underlying spaces of uncertainty – where we are interested in the set of all pos-
sible hierarchies of beliefs – not all hierarchies over  are relevant. That is, given the nature of
awareness, there are beliefs that simply do not make sense. Therefore, we need to place some
restrictions which eliminate certain hierarchies:
R1 Player i knows what she is aware of, i.e., Γμ0 is a singleton.
8In general, knowledge is conceptually different from belief with probability 1, but we consider them as equivalent
for terminology simplicity (Brandenburger and Dekel, 1987).
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Let Θ1  Θ0 contain the hierarchies that satisfy R1. That is, the space of ﬁrst order beliefs
becomes a copy . This restriction alone does not rule out the possibility that i believes that j
does not know what she is aware of. We do that by requiring R1 to be commonly known, and
we denote the space of hierarchies that satisfy this requirement by Θ1  Θ1.
R2 Player i of type θi  Θ1 cannot believe that j is aware of an action that i herself is not aware
of, i.e., if A, μ0  Γμ1, then A  A, where Γμ0  A.
Let Θ2  Θ1 contain the hierarchies that satisfy R1 R2 and common knowledge of R1.
Once again, R2 does not rule out the possibility that i believes that j believes that i is aware of an
action that i believes that j is not aware of. We do that by requiring R1 R2 to be commonly
known, and we denote the space of hierarchies that satisfy this requirement by Θ2  Θ2. Finally,
as usual, we impose the standard coherency restriction:
R3 A belief hierarchy satisﬁes coherency, i.e., margBk1 μk  μk1 for all k  0.
LetΘ3  Θ2 contain the hierarchies that satisfy R1 R3 and common knowledge of R1
R2. Once again, R3 does not rule out the possibility that i believes that j believes that i is
aware of an action that i believes that j is not aware of. We do that by requiring R1  R3
to be commonly known, and we denote the space of hierarchies that satisfy this requirement by
Θ3  Θ3. We call Θ3 the universal space of awareness-consistent belief hierarchies. Then, we
extend the standard result to this setting that accounts for awareness-consistency.
Proposition 3.1. There is a homeomorphism g3 : Θ3  ΔΘ3.
The previous result implies that Θ3 is both terminal and complete. That is, all belief hierarchies
that satisfy R1 R3 and common knowledge of R1 R3 belong to Θ3, and also the func-
tion g3 is onto (see again Section 2.2).
3.2. Awareness in repeated games
In the previous section we lay the foundations for modeling hierarchies of beliefs about awareness
in the stage game. However, that setting is entirely static, which may not allow to capture certain
states of mind. To see this consider the following simple example.
Example 3.1. Suppose that there are two different contingencies (time periods), t  1, 2, and a
symmetric normal form game with S  a, b, c. At t  1 player i:
 is aware of actions a and b,
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 believes that at t  1 player j is aware only of action a,
 believes that at t  2 player j will be aware of a and b.
In principle there is no reason why we should assume that i believes that j’s awareness remains
constant over time. Thus, at t  1 player i forms beliefs about j’s awareness at every t, also forms
beliefs about j’s beliefs at every t about i’s awareness at every t, and so on.
At the same time, i’s awareness and beliefs at t  2 need not be the same as at t  1, but still
i at t  1 cannot foresee these changes, thus believing at t  1 that in the future neither her own
awareness nor her beliefs about j’s awareness at every contingency will change. 
In a repeated game setting the different contingencies correspond to the different histories.
In order to capture i’s entire hierarchy of beliefs at some history h we consider the following
sequence:

B0 : 

B1 :

B0  ΔB0     ΔB0  
hH


B0 
hHΔB0
...

Bk :

Bk1  ΔBk1     ΔBk1  
hH


Bk1 
hHΔBk1
...
A belief hierarchy after ht is a vector

θi ht : 
μ0,μ1, ...  ∞k1Δ

Bk, where
μk , denotes i’s
k-th order beliefs. Let

Θ0 : ∞k1Δ

Bk denote the set of all belief hierarchies that i may hold at
some h.
Of course it is possible that player i is not aware of the existence of some histories, i.e., the
ones that in order to be reached an action that i is not aware of needs to be played. Thus, similar
to the static case, we impose a number of restrictions on the belief hierarchies, which arise as a
consequence of the nature of awareness.
R1 Player i knows what she is aware of, i.e., Γ
μ0 is a singleton.
Deﬁnition 3.1. Let i’s awareness given some type

θi be denoted by a

θi  : a1

θi   a2θi ,
where aj

θi  denotes the set of j’s actions that i is aware of for each j  1, 2.
That is, if Γμ0  A then a

θi   A. Let

Θ1  Θ0 contain the hierarchies that satisfy R1,
and

Θ1  Θ1 contain those hierarchies that satisfy R1 and common knowledge of R1.
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R2 At every history ht 

s1, ..., st 1  St1 player i is aware of all action that have been
played before reaching this history, i.e., player i’s type

θi satisﬁes s1τs2τ  aθi 
for all τ  1, ..., t 1.
Again, let

Θ2  Θ1 contain the hierarchies that satisfy R1 R2 and common knowledge
of R1, and

Θ2  Θ2 contain those hierarchies that also satisfy common knowledge of R2.
R3 Player i of type

θi  Θ2 cannot believe that after any history j is aware of an action that
i herself is not aware of, i.e., if

A, μ0h; h  H
  Γμ1, then Ah  A for every h  H,
where Γμ0h  Ah.
Again, let

Θ3  Θ2 contain the hierarchies that satisfy R1 R3 and common knowledge
of R1  R2, and

Θ3  Θ3 contain those hierarchies that satisfy R1  R3 and common
knowledge of R1 R3.
R4 Player i of type

θi  Θ3 believes that j has perfect recall, i.e., if

A, μ0h; h  H
  Γμ1
and h is a sub-history of h, then Ah  Ah , where Γμ0h  Ah and Γμ0h

  Ah .
Once again, let

Θ4  Θ3 contain the hierarchies that satisfy R1 R4 and common knowl-
edge of R1 R3, and

Θ4  Θ4 contain those hierarchies that satisfy R1 R4 and common
knowledge of R1 R4.
Finally, we impose the standard coherency requirement:
R5 A belief hierarchy satisﬁes coherency, i.e., margBk1
μk  μk1 for all k  0.
Let

Θ5  Θ4 denote the space of coherent belief hierarchies, whilst Θ5  Θ5 denotes the
space of hierarchies that satisfy R1 R5 and common knowledge of R1 R5. We call

Θ5
the universal awareness-consistent type space for the repeated game.
Proposition 3.2. There is a homeomorphism g5 : Θ5  ΔhH

Θ5.
Though an element of

Θ5 refers to i’s beliefs about the awareness structure at other than the
current history, it is still static in the sense that it does not induce any beliefs about i’s own aware-
ness and beliefs at other histories. However, in this particular setting the nature of awareness is
such that introducing further uncertainty about the own type

θi at other histories would induce
a redundancy. The reason is that i at a history h is conﬁdent that at every subsequent history
she will have the same type, i.e., she is unaware of the possibility that her current awareness and
beliefs may be wrong. At the same type she has perfect recall in the sense that she remembers her
past types, and therefore she assigns probability 1 to them. We will further discuss this matter in
more details in the following section.
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Deﬁnition 3.2. A type space is a tuple 

ΘiiN, gi iN, where Θi  Θ5 is Polish, and gi :
Θi  ΔhH

Θj is continuous and agrees with
g5 on Θi .
For notation simplicity, let gi θi  : gi θi . Let also marghgi 

θi   ΔΘj denote the mar-
ginal of gi θi  that corresponds to the type of the opponent at history h, i.e., it determines i’s
current beliefs about j’s type at the history h.
Deﬁnition 3.3. A behavioral strategy for player i at h in a repeated game with limited awareness
is a function σi h : Θi  ΔSi h.
The (repeated game) strategy that σi h induces for a particular type θi is denoted by σi h,θi ,
and the stage game strategy that σi h,θi  induces is denoted by σih,θi .
Remark 3.1. Player i’s strategy determines what i’s contingent plan at h would be for every pos-
sible type

θi . Of course, in reality at h player i of type

θi is aware of only the histories that do not
involve any action she is not aware of (see Restriction R2). Therefore, she cannot really make a
contingent plan for those histories that she is not aware of. However, for notation simplicity we
assume that σi h determines a behavioral strategy all types and all subsequent histories. This
does not affect neither our results nor our intuition, since the behavioral strategies that correspond
to these histories do not enter i’s hierarchy of beliefs. 
The expected payoff to i at ht given

θi is equal to
ui
σ htθi   ∑
θ j 

Θj
marght
gi θ j θi viσiht,θi , σjht,θ j 

T
∑
τt1
∑
hτHτht
βhτσ hτ1 ∑
θ j 

Θj
marghτ
gi θ j θi viσihτ,θi , σjhτ,θ j .
We say thatσi ht is a best response toσ ht for player i givenθi at ht, and we writeσi ht,θi  
BRi
σj htθi , whenever
σi ht,θi   arg max
Δ

Si ht
ui
σi ht,σj htθi .
We say thatσi ht is a best response toσ ht for player i at ht, andwewriteσi ht  BRiσj ht,
whenever σi ht is a best response to σ ht for player i given every θi  Θi at ht.
3.3. Equilibrium with limited awareness
The equilibrium concept that we propose has a similar ﬂavor as the standard Bayesian Nash equi-
librium (Harsanyi, 1967-68). Though, the players may have wrong beliefs about the awareness
12
structure of the opponent, in equilibrium they have correct beliefs about what the opponent does
given every awareness structure that they are aware of, i.e., i has correct beliefs about the j’s be-
havioral strategy given each type

θ j . Of course, i in principle forms beliefs only about what j
does at the types

θ j  Γgi θi  that i considers as possible. Therefore, what j does at other types
is in any case completely irrelevant from i’s point of view, since i assigns probability 0 to those
types that she is not aware of. Formally:
Deﬁnition 3.4. A strategy proﬁle σ ht  σ1ht,σ2ht is a Nash equilibrium at ht in the
repeated game with limited awareness, whenever
σi ht,θi   BRiσ htθi 
for all

θi  Θi and for all i  1, 2.
Note that we deﬁne Nash equilibrium explicitly for all histories ht since we have to take into
account the possibility that awareness of either or both agents might change during the course of
play.
Proposition 3.3. A Nash equilibrium exists in a ﬁnite horizon repeated game with limited awareness.
Deﬁnition 3.5. A strategy proﬁleσ ht  σ1ht,σ2ht is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
in the repeated game with limited awareness, whenever σ htk is a Nash equilibrium at every
htk  Hht, where σ htk speciﬁes the same strategy as σ ht to every history in Hht.
Intuitively though, the deﬁnition of (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium is sometimes requir-
ing too much. The reason is that Nash equilibrium requires agents to have correct beliefs about
the action choices of all types they are aware of - even those that are "off equilibrium path". In
particular, since we assume that players are conﬁdent about their type we also want to explore
an equilibrium concept which requires less reasoning about the opponent’s type. The alternative
deﬁnition of "subjective Nash equilibrium" that we present below requires only that agent i ’s be-
liefs about j’s action choices should not be contradicted by optimal behavior on the equilibrium
path.
In order to do this we need some more notation. Denote by ξ i

θ j , htθi  the belief player i
of type

θi has about type

θ j ’s action choice at history ht and let ξ iht

θi  be the total probabil-
ity agent i attaches to j’s action choices given his type

θi (i.e. the componentwise product of
ξ i

θ j , htθi  and marght
gi θ j θi ). To save notation we will sometimes denote the latter simply
by ξ iht. Furthermore we denote a players realized (ex post) type by 	θi.
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Deﬁnition 3.6. A strategy proﬁle σ ht  σ1ht,σ2ht is a subjective Nash equilibrium at ht
in the repeated game with limited awareness, whenever
(i) σi ht,θi   BRiξ iht

θi 
(ii) σ iht,	θi  Γ ξht
for all

θi  Θi and for all i  1, 2.
The deﬁnition of subjective subgame perfect Nash equilibrium follows in the obvious way.
3.4. Change of types over time
Although player i is certain about her past type and conﬁdent about the future type, this does not
mean that her type will remain constant throughout all histories. There are two questions that
arise at this point:
 Which are the types that i may have given the types that she had at every sub-history?
 Under what conditions does a player’s type change over time?
We start from the ﬁrst question: Given that i remembers at h what her type was at all preceding
histories, the only requirement is the following:
R6 For two histories h, h  H, with h being subsequent to h, if

θi and

θi
 are the corresponding
types, then a

θi   aθi .
Now, we turn to the second question. In principle, at every ht player i is conﬁdent that her
awareness and beliefs described by

θi are correct, and therefore unless she observes something
unexpected her type will remain the same. Therefore, we need to deﬁne what “unexpected obser-
vation" means. In order to do that, it is necessary to deﬁne what is a

θi -rationalizable strategy at
ht. Let Δ
ai θi , ht : hHhtΔai

θi  be the action space that i is aware of ht when her type
is

θi , and consider the following sequence:

Ri 0ht  σi ht  ΔSi ht

Θi : σi ht,θi   Δai θi 

Ri 1ht  σi ht  R0i ht : σi ht  BRiσj ht;σj ht 

Rj0ht
...

Ri kht  σi ht  R0i ht : σi ht  BRiσj ht;σj ht 

Rj k1ht
...
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Deﬁnition 3.7. We say that a strategy proﬁleσ ht  σ1ht,σ2ht is rationalizable whenever
σi ht 

k0

Ri kht,
for both i  1, 2.
Deﬁnition 3.8. We say that a behavioral strategy σi ht,θi  is θi -rationalizable if it is the θi
element of a rationalizable strategy proﬁle σ ht.
The set of

θi -rationalizable strategies contains those contingent plans that i believes that they
can be rationalized given her awareness structure. For some

θ j  Γmarght
gi θi  the set of
θ j -rationalizable strategies contains those behavioral strategies that i believes that j will be able
to rationalize in case j’s type is

θ j , which is something that i considers as possible. Because of
restriction R3 player i believes that she must be able to rationalize more strategies than j.
Proposition 3.4. If a strategy proﬁle is

θ j -rationalizable at ht then it is also

θi -rationalizable for every
θ j  Γmarght
gi θi .
Remark 3.2. The converse is not necessarily true, i.e., i may believe that a strategy is rationalizable
given her type

θi and at the same time believe that j believes that it is not, given the type

θ j which
i considers as possible. 
Assumption 3.1. Every player plays a

θi -rationalizable strategy at every history and for every
θi and this is commonly known. 
4. Results with limited awareness
The aim of this section is twofold. On the one hand we would like to point out the conditions
under which awareness converges. The second set of results refer to the induced equilibrium path
in any (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium of the repeated game with limited awareness, where
roughly speaking we show that a "small amount of unawareness" is enough to yield outcomes
that are very different from the standard common knowledge case. We will also show when the
standard folk theorems apply and when they do not in games with limited awareness.
4.1. Convergence of Awareness
A natural question given our setting is whether there are conditions that ensure that agents will
not learn about new actions anymore, i.e. whether there exists a time t s.t. t  t the set aθi , ht
stays constant. More precisely let’s use the following deﬁnition.
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Deﬁnition 4.1. We say that awareness has converged at time t whenever t  t : aθi , ht 
a

θi , ht.
Ideally one would like to be able also to say something about the convergence of types

θ .
Since (except for (R1 R5) we do not impose restrictions on higher order beliefs, we can never
ensure pointwise convergence of types. For the same reason also convergence to some invariant
subset of

Θ can only be ensured by imposing trivial conditions. This is why for now we focus
on convergence of action awareness. In order to state the following proposition we still need a
little more notation. Denote by SNE the support of the set of Nash equilibria of the repeated game.
Then we can state the following proposition
Proposition 4.1. Generally awareness converges at twhenever either (i) a : a

θ1 , ht  a

θ2 , ht
or (ii) SNE is ﬁrst-order mutual knowledge. Trivial convergence occurs if a  S.
The intuition for the Proposition is quite obvious. Note that the only way to learn about new
actions is either to observe them or to ﬁnd them through exploration after observing something
non rationalizable. If both players know exactly the same set of actions and if this fact is ﬁrst-
order mutual knowledge neither condition can ever obtain. The same is true if SNE is ﬁrst order
mutual knowledge, as can be seen in the Appendix.
4.2. The Induced Equilibrium Path
4.2.1. (Subgame Perfect) Nash Equilibria
In this subsection we establish necessary and sufﬁcient conditions on the type space

Θ that ensure
that an equilibrium in the game with common knowledge continues to be an equilibrium in the
game with unawareness given the restricted type space. We will employ the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4.2. Denote by

Θ k  Θ the type space obtained from Θ by making the additional
restriction that the action set S is at least k-th order mutual knowledge θ  Θ k.
Obviously the space

Θ∞ corresponds to the standard case where the action set is common
knowledge among the players. Note also that for any k it is the case that

Θ k1  Θ k. The
following Proposition shows that the conditions on

Θ needed for a Nash equilibrium (NE) path
from the game with common knowledge to be induced even with some unawareness are fairly
week. Denote by σ NE∞ a Nash equilibrium of the ﬁnitely repeated game with type space Θ∞.
Proposition 4.2. We can be sure that for any stage game G and any σ NE∞ there is a subjective NE
	θ  Θ kthat induces the path induced by σ NE∞if and only if k  1.
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Hence, if and only if we restrict the type space in such a way that the action set is (at least)
ﬁrst-order mutual knowledge we can retrieve any NE-path of the original game in a subjective NE
of the game with unawareness. The intuition is quite obvious. Assume that players do not have
ﬁrst order mutual knowledge of S. Then if both players believe that their opponent is only aware
of Sj  Sj they will choose a best response to beliefs contained in ΔSj what need obviously not
induce a NE path. Note that the qualiﬁer “any stage game" is important here, since it is obviously
the case that games can be found where ﬁrst order-mutual knowledge is not needed to maintain
a NE path. On the other hand if the action set is ﬁrst-order mutual knowledge then agents beliefs
will be on ΔSj and hence all Nash equilibria can be maintained.9
Proposition 4.3. We can be sure that for any stage game G and any σ SPNE∞ there is a subjective SPNE
	θ  Θ kthat induces the path induced by σ SPNE∞if and only if k  2.
The intuition for this result is slightly more complicated and best explained with an example.
Consider the following game
X Y Z
A 3,2 2,1 1,3
B 4,8 12,13 7,15
C 2,17 18,18 6,23
which we assume is ﬁrst-order mutual knowledge. (Note that since this stage game has a unique
Nash equilibrium, the unique σ SPNE∞ involves players choosing B,Z at each period). Sup-
pose now, that S is not second-order mutual knowledge. More speciﬁcally, assume that the col-
umn player (CP) believes that the row player (RP) believes that the CP does not know action
Z. (Formally margh1
gCPθ k1 	θCP  1 and margh1 gCPθk2 θk1  1, where aθk1 , ht  S but
a

θk2 , ht  A, B,C  X,Y). On the other hand assume that the RP knows the game and
knows the CP’s true type. The strategy proﬁle inducing B,Z, t is not a (subjective) SPNE given
these types, since in all subgames following histories ht not containing Z, the CP will expect the
RP to choose C (since the unique subjective NE in the one shot game deﬁned through the restric-
tion to S  A, B,C  X,Y is given by C,Y). In subgames following histories containing Z
the CP will expect the RP to choose B10. But then the unique best response of the CP is to choose
9Note also the relation to the result by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995).
10Note though, that choosing B,Z,t is a subjective NE (by Proposition 4.2). The reason is that if the CP holds
the (subjectively wrong) off equilibrium belief that the RP will choose B also after histories not containing Z his best
response is to choose Z in all periods hence such subgames will not be reached.
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Y after histories that do not contain Z. The following path is induced in a SPNE
C,Y  C,Y...  C,Y  
t1,..T2
 B,Z  B,Z.
Since the CP believes that the RP believes that the CP does not know Z, he will choose Y in
periods t  1, ..T  2 in order not to reveal his knowledge of Z to the row player. The RP can
see through this "deception" but since it is in her interest not to reveal her type she will choose
C. At T  1, though, the CP will choose Z in order to reap the deviation payoff of 23. Since the
RP anticipates this she will choose B at T  1. This means that the CP realizes he was holding
a wrong assessment of the RP’s knowledge and updates his type accordingly. Observe that as
T  ∞ the outcome will be C,Y almost all the time in this equilibrium.
Note also that if S were second order mutual knowledge this could not be an equilibrium path,
since then at T  2 the CP (knowing that the RP knows that he knows Z) would expect the RP
to choose B at T  1 and hence would have no incentives to choose Y himself at T  1. Finally
note that in games (such as the one above), where there is no Nash folk theorem, second-order
mutual knowledge is necessary only if the SPNE in question is not pareto-efﬁcient. The reason
simply is that whenever the SPNE of the game with common knowledge is pareto efﬁcient at least
one player will not have an incentives to avoid the "subjective subgames" where one of the SPNE
actions is not common knowledge. In the next subsection we will analyze ﬁnitely repeated games
where we have folk theorems.
Remark 4.1. Note that both Propositions 4.2 and 4.3 also hold in a Nash equilibrium for some realized
types with ﬁrst (second) - order mutual knowledge. The sufﬁciency part will not hold for all types in

Θ 1
(

Θ 2), though.
4.2.2. Folk Theorems
In this subsection we consider stage games G that satisfy the conditions for the Nash folk theo-
rem for ﬁnitely repeated games (Benoit and Krishna, 1985) and ask which payoff vectors can be
sustained in a Nash equilibrium as we put more and more restrictions on the type space

Θ .
Obviously without restrictions on

Θ (other than R1 R5) any game payoff can be induced
at a Nash equilibrium by simply choosing the appropriate types.11 On the other hand under the
most extreme restriction on the type space, where we require common knowledge of the entire
game (

Θ∞), we obviously have the folk theorem by assumption, i.e. know that every individually
rational (IR) payoff vector can be approximated at a Nash equilibrium. Interestingly it is not
11Note that one can always choose types s.t. each player is only aware of one particular action.
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true that by placing more restrictions on

Θ we monotonically get sharper predictions. This is
illustrated by the following proposition.
Proposition 4.4. Consider any game G with Nash folk theorem and assume the relevant space is

Θ 0. Then
it is neither true (in general) that payoff vectors which are not IR can be ruled out at a Nash equilibrium of
the repeated game based on G, nor is it true that every IR payoff vector can be approximated.
If both players know the entire action set (but do not necessarily know that the other player
does so), then the equilibrium prediction of the game with limited awareness is neither nested by
nor does it nest the prediction of the case with common knowledge. Note that in the Proposition
we use individual rationality as an objective concept taken from the case of common knowledge.
Obviously, since we assume that players - given their awareness - are fully rational their behavior
will always be "subjectively individually rational".
The intuition behind this Proposition is again best illustrated with an example. Let’s start
with the ﬁrst part, which is less obvious. Consider the following stage game, which we assume is
repeated for T  4 periods.
X Y Z
A 5,6 0,5 5,5
B -50,-12 -5,-11 100,-10
C 3,2 2,5 3,5
We assume that both players know the entire action set, (i.e. restrict to

Θ 0) but we assume that
the row player (RP) has the following beliefs about the column player’s type at the beginning
of the game (at t  1). He attaches high probability to the column player (CP) being of type

θY
where a

θY  A, B,C  Y and low probability to the CP being of type θX where aθX 
A, B,C  X. Say margh1
gRPθY θRP  0.99 and margh1
gRPθXθRP  0.01. Assume also
that the CP knows the type of the RP, i.e., knows that he is holding this ﬁrst-order belief and
that Bayesian updating of beliefs is common knowledge. Then the following can be an induced
equilibrium path:
B,X  A,X  A,X  A,X.
On this path then the payoff vector that the RP obtains is clearly not individually rational. Why
can this be an equilibrium ? Note ﬁrst that the RP would obviously like to reach an equilibrium
where B,Z is played along the equ. path. Now given his type at t  1 the only way he sees to
achieve this is to choose an action that he believes the CP will ﬁnd non rationalizable and hope
that as a consequence the CP will "learn" about Z (with some probability ε). Whenever ε is “big
enough" he will ﬁnd it optimal to choose B. Now consider the decision of the CP. She knows the
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type of the RP and hence she can anticipate his reasoning in equilibrium. But given this it will be
optimal for her to choose X in order to make the row player belief that she only knows X. Note
that the RP in turn cannot anticipate this reasoning, since he is strictly less aware than the CP.
Note that in a standard repeated game setting with incomplete information such a result could
not be obtained since in this setting every subjectively individually rational payoff vector is also
objectively individually rational.
The second part of the Proposition is also illustrated easily using the game above. Assume e.g.
that the RP believes that the CP does not know Y. Then the individually rational payoff vector of
2, 5 cannot be approximated.
Some more remarks are at order. First one might wonder what the lowest possible sustainable
payoff vector is given type space

Θ 0 ? In general this is simply the second-lowest payoff in the
game. Also note that as soon as the action set is ﬁrst-order mutual knowledge we obtain again
the Nash folk theorem, which follows essentially from Proposition 4.2. Finally note that payoff
vectors which are not (objectively) individually rational can only be part of an equilibrium (if the
action set is mutual knowledge) if awareness converges strictly after period t  1. In the next
subsection we want to discuss the implications of observing non-rationalizable behavior on the
equilibrium path a little more closely.
4.2.3. Non-rationalizable Behavior
One of the questions we want to ask in this subsection is which conditions on the initial types have
to be satisﬁed s.t. the set of sustainable payoffs that the agents foresee at t  1 coincides with those
that are actually sustainable given their types ? The answer to this question will also delimit the
range of situations where our model can be thought of as a standard model of repeated games
with incomplete information, since if these conditions are satisﬁed there will be no unforeseen
contingencies. The previous two subsections suggest that these conditions will be quite restrictive
in general games. Some results may be obtained, though, in speciﬁc classes of games.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Deﬁne the following subset of  Δ:
B1 :


A, μ0   Δ : A  A ; Γμ0  A

, R2  KR1
The second order beliefs in ΔB1 are those that satisfy R2 and knowledge of R1.
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First we show that B1 is Polish. Since is ﬁnite – endowed with the discrete topology – it is Hausdorff,
implying that every singleton A is closed in , and therefore Polish. Now, B1 can be rewritten as

A

AA


A, μ0   Δ : Γμ0  A

.
Since A is closed in  it follows that μ0  Δ : μ0A  1 is closed in Δ (Aliprantis and
Border, 1994; Corollary 15.6). In addition – as we have already shown – A is closed in . Therefore,

A, μ0   Δ : Γμ0  A

is closed in  Δ and therefore Polish, implying that it is also
Gδ. Since the ﬁnite union of Gδ sets is also Gδ, it follows that B1 is Polish.
Now, let Bk : Bk1  ΔBk1 for all k  1, and consider belief hierarchies such that μ0 is such that
Γμ0 is a singleton, and also μk  ΔBk for k  1. These belief hierarchies form the space Θ2, i.e., they
satisfy R1 R2 and common knowledge of R1 R2.
Since, Bk is Polish for every k  0, we can apply Lemma 1 from Brandenburger and Dekel (1993),
implying that there is a homeomorphism Θ3  ΔΘ2. Finally, from Proposition 2 in Brandenburger and
Dekel (1993) it follows that there is a homeomorphism g3 : Θ3  ΔΘ3, which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. The proof is similar to the one of Proposition 3.1: Deﬁne the following subset of
 hHΔ:

B1 :

 
A, μ0 h; h  H
   hHΔ : h  s1, ..., st and Γμ0 h  Ah 
s1τ  s2τ  Ah, for all τ  1, ..., t, and all h  H

R2  KR1
 
 A, μ0 h; h  H   hHΔ : Ah  A, for all h  H ; Γμ0 h  Ah  R3  KR1
 
 A, μ0 h; h  H   hHΔ : Ah  Ah , for all h  H and all h  Hh ;
Γμ0 h  Ah and Γμ0 h  Ah

R4  KR

1
The second order beliefs in Δ

B1 are those that satisfy R2 R4 and knowledge of R1.
First we show that

B1 is Polish. Since, R1 is known, every Γ
μ0 h is a singleton, and thus there are
ﬁnitely many elements in

B1. We show that each one of them is a Polish subspace of 
hHΔ,
and therefore Gδ, which implies that their union is also Gδ, ﬁnally implying that

B1 is Polish. Take any
A, μ0 h; h  H

such that Γμ0 h  Ah for all h  H. Then, μ0 h  Δ : μ0 hAh  1 is closed
in Δ for all h  H (Aliprantis and Border, 1994; Corollary 15.6). In addition, A is closed in , and
therefore

A, μ0 h; h  H

is closed in  hHΔ, which proves that B1 is Polish.
Now, let

Bk :

Bk1  ΔBk1 for all k  1, and consider belief hierarchies such that μ0 is such that
Γμ0 is a singleton, and also μk  Δ

Bk for k  1. These belief hierarchies form the space Θ4, i.e., they
satisfy R1 R4 and common knowledge of R1 R4.
Since,

Bk is Polish for every k  0, we can apply Lemma 1 from Brandenburger and Dekel (1993),
implying that there is a homeomorphism

Θ5  ΔhHΘ4. Finally, from Proposition 2 in Brandenburger
and Dekel (1993) it follows that there is a homeomorphism g5 : Θ5  ΔhHΘ5.
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Proof of Proposition 3.3. It follows directly from a standard ﬁxed-point-theorem argument.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. Observe that i at

θi knows j’s hierarchy of beliefs at h given that j is of type

θ j .
Then i knows what j believes that it is rationalizable. Therefore, i believes that all strategies that can be
rationalized under some

θ j  Γgi θi  are rationalizable, which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.1
(i) Consider a pair of pure actions s1, s2 / a. Since s1, s2 is not distributive knowledge at t (i.e.
no player is aware of it), either agent can become aware of it if and only if she observes non rationalizable
behavior at some t  t. But since aθ 1, ht  aθ 2, ht at t every behavior on the equilibrium path
is obviously rationalizable. But then at t 1 we have again that a

θ 1, ht1  a

θ 2, ht1 and hence
again every behavior is rationalizable etc..12
(ii) Once SNE is ﬁrst-order mutual knowledge no action pair in SSNE can be sustained on the equi-
librium path. This follows from Benoit and Krishna (1987) together with the following observation. If both
players know exactly SNE we are in case (i). Assume thus that one players knows strictly more than SNE.
If she only knows more in her own action set (SNEi ), she will never choose such an action. If she knows
more also on the opponent’s action set, she might want to induce the opponent to learn about a new action.
Since she knows, though, that the opponent knows SNE and since any such desired outcome must be in
SSNE she knows that he will not choose such an action. Anticipating this she has no incentive to choose
any action outside SNEi .
(iii) Next we prove necessity using the following game as a counterexample
X Y Z
A 1, 1 0, 0 0, 0
B 0, 0 1, 2 100, 100
C 10, 1 10, 2 10, 3
.
Note that SNE  A, B  X,Y,Z. Assume that aθ CP  SNE (here θ CP denotes the type of
the CP) and a

θ RP  S and furthermore that marght g

θ θ RP  1 where aθ   A, B,C 
X,Y. (So both players know SNE but this is not ﬁrst-order mutual knowledge). With these types the RP
has an incentive (for ε large enough) to choose C at time t in order for the CP to learn Z. But then the CP
will learn C at t 1 hence awareness had not converged at t.
Proof of Proposition 4.2
(i) First we shownecessity. Denote by

Θ0i the subspace of

Θ 0i s.t. 

θ 0i 

Θ0i :

θ  Γ
g iθ 0i 

 aθ   S. Note that Θ0i 

Θ 1i 

Θ 0i , i.e. we restrict the domain of
g i to exclude ﬁrst-order mu-
12In fact under this condition subjective rationalizability and objective rationalizability in the restricted
game with action set a do coincide.
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tual knowledge. By deﬁnition (since θ  Γ
g iθ 0i 

: a

θ   S) both players will choose a best
response to beliefs contained in Δ S for some S  S. Since we can choose θ 0i 

Θ0i freely it is
always possible to ﬁnd a stage game G and realized types 	θ0i such that a NE of the game with type space
Θ∞i

i1,2
cannot be induced on S.
(ii) Denote by

Θ1i the subspace of

Θ 1i s.t. 

θ 1i 

Θ1i , 

θ Γ  Γ
g iθ 1i 

:

θ 
Γ
g iθ Γi 

 aθ   S. Recursively we deﬁne all Θki in this way. For sufﬁciency we can then
simply note that whenever g i maps into Δ

h

Θ1i

which it does if the action set is exactly
ﬁrst-order mutual knowledge, then θ  Θ1i : a

θ   Si and hence any NE-path can be induced
by choosing the appropriate belief on ΔSi, which will not be contradicted on the equ. path since it is a
NE.
Proof of Proposition 4.3
(i) Again we show ﬁrst necessity. Consider the type space deﬁned by

Θ 1i

i1,2
. Then we know
(by Proposition 4.2) that all NE-paths of the game with type space

Θ∞i

i1,2
can be induced. It will be
possible, though, to ﬁnd games s.t. some SPNE-path from the game with type space

Θ∞i

i1,2
cannot
be induced in a (subjective) SPNE for some types in

Θ 1i

i1,2
. In particular consider types

θ i  Θ 1i
s.t. there are two different histories: ht s.t. marght
g iθ i  Δ

Θ0i

and ht s.t. marght
g iθ i 
Δ

Θ1i

(as deﬁned in the proof of Proposition 4.2 (ii)). But given this we know (from Proposition 4.2)
that we cannot guarantee any NE-path of the common knowledge case to be induced in the "subjective
subgame" following history ht. In particular this can be the case if a Nash action si is not contained in

θ Γi Γ

marght
g i

θ i
 aθ Γi . Of course now such a history ht can only be reached (by restriction
(R5)) if si is not observed at any time 1, ..., t 1. This will be the case whenever it is optimal for player
i to induce the equilibrium path containing ht rather than ht and (of course whenever player i has no
incentives to deviate). Now by choosing action si in such a way that the NE-path including s
 is on the
continuation path for the SPNE in question and choosing the game payoffs appropriately such a game can
always be constructed.
(ii) To establish sufﬁciency note that if the relevant type space is

Θ 2i

i1,2
then the function g i will
map into Δ

h

Θ 1i

. But this means that in any "subjective subgame" all NE-paths of the game
with common knowledge can be recovered (by Proposition 4.2). Consequently all SPNE from the game
with type space

Θ∞i

i1,2
can be recovered.
Proof of Proposition 4.4
(i) Let us ﬁrst show that not all NE of the game with type space

Θ 0i ,
g i

i1,2
are (objectively) indi-
vidually rational. Consider a stage game G with two NE s1, s

2 and 	s1,	s2 s.t. vis1, s2 vi	s1,	s2 
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xi, i  1, 2. Assume x1  0 and x2  0 and also that s1 is not rationalizable in the reduced game
with action space S  S1  S2s2. Then, player 1 will choose s1 at t  1 even if he believes that

θ Γ1 Γ
g 1θ 1
 aθ Γ1  S. Denote by s2 the best response of player 2 to s1 in the game with action
space S and deﬁne v1	s1,	s2 v1s1, s2  y1  0. Then this can be the case e.g. if ε T  1x1  y1
1 ε y1  v   0, where v is the continuation payoff in the game starting at t  2 when no discovery
occured. Obviously for every ε game payoffs can be found that satisfy this equation. This can be a Nash
equilibrium since x2  0.
(ii) The fact that not all individually rational payoff vectors can be recovered follows directly from
Proposition 4.2.
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